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Abstract
In this paper I develop a simple dynamic agency model postulating that, among bud-
getary institutions, transparency of the budgeting process is the main driving force in ex-
plaining diﬀerences in ﬁscal outcomes and that budgetary numeric rules can be an active
long-run constraint only if the budgeting process is transparent enough. The model does not
only account for long-run diﬀerences where countries with better budgetary institutions will
have more disciplined ﬁscal outcomes, but can rationalize situations where countries with
relatively better budgetary institutions can have what would appear to be less disciplined
ﬁscal outcomes in the short-run. Empirical tests corroborate some but not all of the model’s
predictions.
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Resumen
En este art´ ıculo se presenta un modelo de agencia din´ amico en el cual se postula que
la transparencia del proceso presupuestario es la principal causante de las diferencias en los
resultados ﬁscales, y que las reglas num´ ericas sobre el presupuesto pueden ser una restricci´ on
activa en el largo plazo, ´ unicamente si el proceso presupuestario es lo suﬁcientemente trans-
parente. El modelo puede explicar no solo diferencias en resultados ﬁscales en el largo plazo,
d´ onde pa´ ıses con mejores instituciones siempre tendr´ an resultados ﬁscales m´ as disciplina-
dos, sino tambi´ en racionalizar situaciones de corto plazo, donde pa´ ıses con relativamente
mejores instituciones presupuestarias pueden presentar resultados ﬁscales que en aparien-
cia son menos disciplinados. Los resultados emp´ ıricos del trabajo corroboran algunas de las
predicciones del modelo.
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\Elected o±cials typically enjoy an immense informational advantage over the voters that
limits how accountable such agents will be to the voters desires. This is a consequence of
the complexity of modern government." (Ferejohn (1999)).
Budgetary Institutions are de¯ned as the set of all the rules and regulations according to
which budgets are prepared, approved and carried out (Alesina and Perotti (1999)). What
is the role of budgetary institutions in shaping the size of the budget and, ultimately, the
delivery of public goods? How independent are these institutions from each other and
which ones, if any, are truly necessary to a®ect ¯scal outcomes? This paper deals with
these questions and explains how di®erent countries that are supposed to obey the same
set of rules, such as the members of the European Union and the Maastrich Treaty, can
have dissimilar ¯scal outcomes. In other words, it will provide an explanation of how and
when these rules will be an active constraint on the government.
In this literature, stronger ¯scal institutions are de¯ned as those that provide more dis-
cipline in the budgeting process, reducing the margin for unproductive spending (Poterba
and von Hagen (1999)). The implication is that, other things being equal, stronger in-
stitutions should cause, by means of stricter constraints, lower de¯cits and levels of debt
for the same amount of public goods. The budgetary institutions that are analyzed in
the present paper are the transparency of the budgetary process and the set of numeric
rules imposed on the budget. Transparency of the budgetary process can be de¯ned as the
degree of openness towards the public at large about government structure and functions,
¯scal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and projections (Kopits and Craig (1998)).
Numeric rules imposed on the budget can take the form of speci¯c limits to expenditures,
debt and de¯cit, or restrictions to the °ow of resources between and within programs,
agencies and levels of government. These constraints could even be restrictions to the °ow
of resources between di®erent ¯scal periods.
To study these two budgetary institutions, in the ¯rst part of the paper I provide
a career concern model in which the government has an agency relationship with their
constituents and might enjoy some information advantages, depending on the degree of
transparency of the budgetary process. Voters can try to discipline the incumbent through
elections and by imposing numeric rules. The results of the model show that more trans-
parency will increase ¯scal discipline, while numeric budgetary rules will be e®ective only
if the budgetary process is transparent enough.
This model was inspired by two well known pieces in the political economy literature:
the political business cycle model with prospective voting (Rogo® and Siebert (1988), Ro-
go® (1990), Shi and Svensson (2001)), and the elections as a disciplining device model
with retrospective voting (Ferejohn (1986)). To the best of my knowledge, no other
1work {besides Milesi-Ferretti (2004){ provides a theoretical framework for the relation-
ship between transparency and numeric constraints on the budgeting process and their
implications over de¯cits or other ¯scal variables. The novel characteristics of the model
presented here are: First, the model is able to accommodate not only long-run results,
where stronger institutions will always cause more constrained ¯scal outcomes, but also
short-run implications, where countries with relatively stronger institutions can be paired
with relatively unconstrained outcomes. Second, the main claim of the model is that
transparency is the major force for generating di®erences in the levels of debt, and that
numeric constraints can have opposing e®ects for the same numeric rule, depending on the
level of transparency.
The second part of the paper provides empirical evidence of the e®ects of budgetary
institutions on ¯scal outcomes. I exploit a new data set to construct measures of numerical
constraints on the budget and the degree of budgetary transparency, and assess their
in°uence on a series of ¯scal outcomes. In particular, I test the two principal implications
of the theoretical model: (i), that more transparency will increase ¯scal discipline and, (ii),
that numeric rules will increase ¯scal discipline only if the budgetary process is transparent
enough. The results of the regression analysis indicate that the only budgetary institution
that appears to have an e®ect on ¯scal outcomes is the transparency of the budgetary
process. I do not ¯nd, however, an e®ect of numeric rules on ¯scal outcomes conditional
on the level of transparency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section 2 I review the literature.
Section 3 presents the career concern model. Section 4 shows the empirical evidence and
section 5 concludes.
2 Literature Review
The theoretical model presented in this work is related to the following literature. Shi and
Svenson (2001) propose a moral hazard model of electoral competition to explain a set of
empirical ¯ndings about the size of electoral budget cycles, and conclude that these depend
on the rents of those remaining in power and the share of informed voters. Alt and Lassen
(2003) slightly modify the Shi and Svenson model and reinterpret the share of informed
voters as transparency in the budgeting process, and conclude that lower transparency
produces higher levels of debt and larger de¯cits. The problem with these models is that
in the absence of electoral cycles (i.e., if there were no elections or if elections occurred in
every period), no debt or de¯cit could be generated. In other words, the Alt and Lassen
model predicts that transparency a®ects ¯scal outcomes only in the electoral year. In
contrast, the model presented here builds on some of the structure of the Shi and Svenson
model, but eliminates the political ¯scal cycle motive by allowing elections to occur in every
period. In spite of this change, the current model still generates an inverse relationship
2between transparency and debt. This is relevant not only from a conceptual perspective,
but also because the majority of empirical tests (Alesina et. al. (1998), Alt and Lassen
(2003)) analyze the cross-sectional implications of transparency in ¯scal outcomes and
none of them show evidence that an election dummy is signi¯cant.
In a seminal paper, Ferejohn (1986), obtained optimal reelection rules when the incum-
bent's actions cannot be directly observed by retrospectively inferring these actions based
on realized outcomes. This pure outcome evaluation can be interpreted in the context of
the model presented here as a case of full opacity, where the signal drawn by the electorate
is simply uninformative. Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997) (PR&T), in a similar setup,
also derive the case of full information, where voters can observe incumbent's actions, and
show that even in this case the incumbent will extract rents from being in power. In terms
of the present model this could be associated with a case of full transparency where the
signal drawn from the private sector perfectly identi¯es the current shock. Whereas the
structure for obtaining the optimal reelection rule is similar to these two previous works,
there are some di®erences that are worth mentioning. Here, the state of the world is not
only determined by an exogenous shock, but also by the history of policy decisions made by
the incumbent. This feature allows situations where the incumbent will optimally choose
to perform actions that are costly only to him and be reelected, even under the most
adverse of shock realizations, provided he has enough ¯scal resources, i.e. that issuing
new debt is not too costly. A second di®erence between this model and those mentioned
previously lies in the fact that I analyzed di®erent degrees of informational asymmetry,
and their relation to ¯scal outcomes in addition to welfare.
The work that is most closely related to the model presented here is Milesi-Ferretti
(2004) which is the ¯rst, and to the best of my knowledge, the only paper that looks
at the e®ects of budgetary rules and budgetary transparency simultaneously on ¯scal
outcomes. In a two-period model, with heterogenous policymakers that seek to minimize
an arbitrary loss function, Milesi-Ferretti shows that the extent to which a myopic ruler
will engage in creative accounting (de¯ned as deviations from a preestablished budgetary
rule) depends negatively on the transparency of the budgetary process. There are two key
di®erences between the two models. The ¯rst one is conceptual. The mechanics of Milesi-
Feretti's model requires a numeric rule to be imposed in order to generate di®erences in
¯scal outcomes. In other words, the same policymaker, if not faced with a numeric rule on
the budget, will deliver the same ¯scal outcome under two di®erent transparency regimes.
By the contrary, the model presented here postulates that policymakers facing di®erent
transparency regimes will deliver di®erent ¯scal outcomes even without the imposition of
a numeric rule. The second important di®erence is that Milesi-Ferretti's model can only
account or be interpreted for long-run results whereas my model also rationalizes short-run
outcomes, as was already mentioned.
Several papers have empirically explored the question of whether budgetary institu-
tions matter. In a series of papers, von Hagen (1992) and von Hagen and Harden (1994)
3and (1996), study the e®ects of budgetary institutions as a whole. They combine in a
single index elements that corresponds to transparency as well as to the voting procedure
to pass the budget, classi¯ed in a hierarchical-collegiate spectrum. They ¯nd that more
hierarchical and transparent budgetary institutions are associated with more ¯scal disci-
pline. Exploring further, von Hagen (1992) suggests that transparency comes second to
hierarchical features in order of importance. De Haan et. al. (1999) use new informa-
tion available to update von Hagen's index for an almost identical sample. These authors
corroborate von Hagen's result that better budgetary institutions as a whole induce ¯scal
discipline. However, they conclude that although the results are statistically signi¯cant,
these are not economically important as was previously claimed.
Alesina et. al. (1999) pursue a di®erent strategy by constructing separate measures for
every category of the budgeting process for a sample of twenty Latin American countries.
Employing ¯scal de¯cits as their ¯scal outcome measure, these authors arrive at the con-
clusion that ¯scal procedures matter for ¯scal de¯cits among Latin American countries,
but when they look at the disaggregated indexes, they ¯nd that numerical rules and hi-
erarchical procedures matter but transparency does not. They do acknowledge, however,
that the \results on transparency probably say more about the di±culty of measuring it,
than about its e®ect on ¯scal discipline" (Alesina and Perotti (1996) p.405). Filc and
Scartascini (2004), employing a new data set that allows them to measure budgetary insti-
tutions ten years later, closely follow Alesina et. al. (1999), and perform the same exercise
for a sample of eleven Latin American countries arriving, at the same conclusions.
Alt and Lassen (2003), using data from 19 OECD countries, concentrate exclusively on
the e®ects of ¯scal transparency on public debt and the central government expenditure.
These authors make a successful attempt at providing guidance about what should contain
a good measure of transparency. They ¯nd signi¯cant and economically important e®ects
of transparency, especially for public debt.
3 A Career Concern Model
I consider an economy populated by a continuum of mass one of identical and in¯nitely
lived individuals called voters. At every moment in time an incumbent, picked randomly
from within the economy, is in charge of the government and will remain in power until
he is voted out and replaced by an identical agent, who was a voter at the end of the
last period, and who now becomes the new incumbent. The former incumbent returns to
the population as a voter, and while nothing forbids him from being elected again, the
probability of this event happening has measure zero.
In each period, voters obtains utility from a public good produced by the incumbent.
4U
v
t = gt; (1)
where g represents per capita amounts of the public good. What is important to note
about equation (1) is that voters know exactly how much of the public good they are
consuming in each period.
The incumbent's period utility function is identical to that of voters, since the in-




t = gt + Â ¡ Á(et); (2)
where Â represents ego rents from being in o±ce, charged every period t, and Á is the
disutility function of the e®ort variable, et, which is the amount of e®ort measured in
dollars that the incumbent devotes to public good production in the present period, and
that is unobserved by voters. I assume that Á is twice continuously di®erentiable and
strictly convex, which implies that the extra unit of e®ort is ever costlier. Both the
incumbent and voters are assumed to maximize expected utility.
The production of the public good is described by the following equation:
gt = µt[dt + et] ¡ D(dt¡1); (3)
where dt is the per period government new debt maturing in the following period, and
D(dt¡1) is the amount of debt plus interest payments maturing this period. Whereas d
and e are choice variables for the government, µt represents an exogenous shock to the
production of public goods. It can be thought of as an input shock summarizing the cost
and composition of raw materials in the production of public goods. I assume that the
set of possible values that µ can take is continuous, compact, time invariant, and common
knowledge for voters and incumbent alike: everyone knows that µt 2 [µ;µ]. I further assume
that µ is identically independent distributed (iid) over the mentioned set with E(µ) = 1.
With respect to the cost of public debt, I follow the same assumptions as Shi and
Svensson (2001) or Alt and Lassen (2003), where D(d) is de¯ned as a convex borrowing
function. In particular, D(0) = 0, D0(0) = 1, and D00(d) > 0 for all d > 0. The convexity of
D means that the marginal cost of borrowing is increasing in the amount of the principal,
which can be linked to the country risk premium.
3.1 Transparency in the Budgeting Process
Transparency of the budgetary process is understood along the lines of Kopits and Craig
(1998), who de¯ne transparency as openness towards the public at large about government
structure and functions, ¯scal policy intentions, public sector accounts, and projections.
5Transparency involves ready access to reliable, comprehensive, timely, understandable, and
internationally comparable information on government activities, so that the electorate and
¯nancial markets can accurately assess the government's ¯nancial position and the true
cost and bene¯ts of government activities, including their present and future economic and
social implications.
Clearly, there is the question if transparency is always bene¯cial. As it has been argued
(Prat, 2005), too much transparency on the agent's actions can lead to outcomes that are
detrimental for the principal. In the context of the present paper, one could think of too
much transparency generating a situation of sclerosis in policy implementation, perhaps
due to con°ict of interests between agents. This paper abstracts from this situation and
it can be interpreted as looking only into the segment where more transparency always
increases government e±ciency.
Here, I condense this notion of transparency in the budgeting process as the ability
of voters to observe the true costs and composition of inputs involved in the production
of the public good. That is, the potential to assess the true value of µ. In this respect, I
assume that only the incumbent can directly observe µ. On the other hand, voters obtain
an estimate1, ~ µ, of the true value of the shock, conditional on the degree of transparency
and the actual realization of µ. For each level of g, the government will like voters to
believe that µ was lower than the actual value and, consequently, make e appear to have
been higher than the level exerted.
Some real world examples that help us understand this mechanism would be:
² Price of cement, steel, aluminum, etc: Voters can see new infrastructure but they
can't know for sure what materials were used to build it. More importantly, without
periodical revisions of the expending accounts, expenses at the end of the year can
be justi¯ed claiming the material was purchased at the peak of the price within the
year.
² Detail over contractors (suppliers): if payments to contractors are fully aggregated
(low transparency), then it is easy to overstate costs. If on the contrary they are
more disaggregated, this possibility is reduced.
To incorporate this idea in the model, I consider the degree of transparency of the
budgetary process to be inversely related to a measure ² 2 [0;²], that is, more transparent
regimes are associated with a lower value of ². I treat ² as a parameter that is both
exogenous and known to the incumbent and voters alike. The reason is that I am interested
in the e®ect of transparency over ¯scal outcomes rather than on the dynamic properties of
transparency itself which, although a very interesting question, goes beyond the scope of
1Also called signal throughout the paper.
6this work. I then assume voters will draw a ~ µ that depends on the given exogenous value
of ², the unobserved realization of µ, and its distribution f(µ). I treat ~ µ as a continuous
uniform random variable that can take any value over the moving interval [max(µ;µt ¡
²);min(µ;µt + ²)].
The inference process about the true value of the shock is informative if it helps to
further bound the set of possible µ. Depending on the level of transparency there are four
possible information regions:
1. Full Transparency (² = 0): in this case ~ µ = µ. This is the most informative case,
where the signal is the shock.
2. High Transparency (² ·
µ¡µ
2 ): in this case the inference process is always informative
in the sense that the signal will give a range of the true value of the shock that is a
subset of [µ;µ]: ~ µ ) µ 2 [max(~ µ ¡ ²;µ);min(~ µ + ²;µ)].
3. Low Transparency (
µ¡µ
2 < ² < µ ¡ µ): in this range, depending on the realization of
~ µ, voters might not be able to reduce the set of possible realizations of µ.
4. Full Opacity (² ¸ µ ¡ µ): a case in which the inference process is simply not infor-
mative.
Given the voter's inference process and ² > 0, the conditional expectation of µ on the





3.2 The Political Economy Equilibrium
This subsection describes the agency game in which voters and the incumbent engage to
maximize their respective expected utilities.
The game is characterized by a succession of identical periods (see Figure 1). A period
starts with an incumbent in o±ce who observes µ and ~ µ. Meanwhile, voters can only
observe ~ µ. Next, the incumbent decides ¯scal policy: dt and et. He repays principal and
interests of outstanding debt, D(dt¡1), and produces the public good, gt, that is consumed
by voters and the incumbent. The period ends with the revelation of dt¡1 and an election
in which voters reappoint the incumbent only if the total utility they got in the period was
high enough. Otherwise, a new government is put in place, the defeated politician returns
to the population as a voter, and the game proceeds to the next period.
2For ² = 0, E(µj~ µ) = ~ µ = µ.
7Figure 1: Timing of the Game.
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The only decision that voters face is how much to demand from the incumbent in each
period, in other words, what is the reelection rule (See Ferejohn (1986) for a classical ex-
ample).3 On the agent side, the incumbent chooses ¯scal policy, subject to the government
budget constraint and to the reelection rule. In other words, every period the incumbent
selects optimal policy under reelection and under expropriation. Expropriation is de¯ned
as a situation in which the incumbent optimally exerts the minimum level of e®ort given
that he will not be reappointed next period. To select the optimal policy, the incumbent
must take into account the endogenous probability of reelection, and then picks the one
that yields the highest lifetime expected discounted utility. One can immediately see the
tradeo® introduced by the reelection rule: in the long-run, higher reelection rules (the ones
that demand higher utility levels) necessarily imply higher levels of e®ort, which in turn
imply a non-decreasing probability of expropriation, and thus, when expropriation occurs,
lower levels of the public good. On the other hand, lower reelection rules will perpetuate
incumbents that put in little e®ort and thus deliver low levels of utility.4




















which in turn is subject to
gt = µt[dt + et] + D(dt¡1);
where at the beginning of period t, EtUv
t = [(p)(Uv
t ¸ ¹ U)+(1¡p)(Uv
t < ¹ U)], and p is the
3It is assumed that voters agree on the reelection rule, i.e. I ignore any coordination problem.
4The incumbent can use more debt to ¯nance higher levels of public good, but only in the short-run
since perpetual roll-over will violate a No Ponzi Game condition.
8probability that the incumbent will choose to ful¯ll the reelection rule.
In order to obtain the solution to (5), I start by ¯nding the solution to (6) for any ¹ U.
De¯ne V I
t = UI
t + ¯EtV I
t+1 as the incumbent's expected present discounted value of being
in o±ce next period, which can be decomposed into his utility at t of providing ¹ U, and the




incumbent's expected present discounted value of being out of o±ce next period, which
is decomposed into his utility at t of reneging ¹ U, and the continuation value of returning
to the population as a voter. Suppose voters have instituted the reelection rule ^ ¹ U. Then,
upon the realization of µ and ~ µ, the incumbent at time t will choose to deliver (at least)










The solution to (7) is not trivial: ¯rst, although it is clear that p a®ects V I
t+1, equation
(7) shows that due to the return of the incumbent to the voter pool, p also a®ects V v
t+1.
Second, it is easy to see that V v
t+1 is the solution to (5) at the optimum ¹ U¤, for which (5)
and (6) must be jointly solved.
In the remainder of this section the model is solved for three particular cases. First, I
consider the dictatorship, an environment in which voters have no power to dethrone the
incumbent and so, regardless on the transparency level, ¹ U plays no role. The dictatorship
is not only the easiest case to solve, but a necessary ¯rst step in the solution of any
democratic case: it provides us with Uo
t in (7). I then proceed to solve the polar cases of
full transparency (² = 0), and full opacity (² ¸ µ ¡ µ).
3.3 No Elections: The Dictatorship
Assume a dictator is in power during period t and that, after observing the amount of debt
outstanding from period t ¡ 1 and the contemporaneous shock, decides his policy action
for period t in order to maximize the present discounted value of his utility, knowing that







t¡1[gt + Â ¡ Á(et)]; (8)
subject to
gt = µt[dt + et] + D(dt¡1)
from which one can write the dynamic programming version of the problem as:
9V
o
t (dt¡1;µt) = maxfgt + Â ¡ Á(et) + ¯EtV
o
t+1(dt;µt+1)g (9)
subject to the government budget constraints.







0(et) = 0 (11)
where the envelope condition is
@V o
t






The ¯rst shows that it will be optimal to incur higher debt to produce the public good
when it is relatively cheap to do so (µ is high); however, note that for ¯ su±ciently high,
there would be states for which debt will be zero. Also note that, given the assumption
that µ is iid, optimal decision is not history dependent. The last optimality condition also
exhibits a positive relationship between public good productivity and e®ort; whether e®ort
would be positive or the condition would be always binding depends on Á and µ. I assume
that no incumbent, whether dictator or not, will voluntarily exert any e®ort by imposing
the following No-E®ort Condition: µ · Á0(0).
In order to perform comparisons of policy, ¯scal outcomes and welfare across di®erent
degrees of transparency I simulate the proposed model, starting with a dictatorship but
assuming the same functional forms and parameters for all scenarios. Table 1 presents
the speci¯c functional forms and parameters. These were arbitrarily chosen, since there
is no intention of doing a calibration, but qualitatively the results are the same for a
di®erent parametrization. The solution is obtained by iterating over the value function
until convergence is reached.
Table 1: Parameters and functional forms
parameters functional forms
¯ = :95 Á(e) = exp(1:2e) ¡ 1
Â = 3 D(d ¸ 0) = d + d2
µt 2 [0:8; 0:9; 1:0; 1:1; 1:2]
Figure 2 presents the dictator policy responses for 60 periods of the simulated model.
I have transformed the continuous variable µ into a discrete one that can take any of ¯ve
10possible values with the same probability. The ¯gure re°ects the two optimality conditions,
where e®ort is always zero, and debt responds positively with the contemporaneous shock,
and is uniquely determined by it. Moreover, it shows the debt optimality condition binding
at su±ciently low levels of µ, i.e. debt is zero for µ · 0:9.
Figure 2: Shock and Policy in the Dictatorship.
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In terms of welfare, measured by V I and V v, while the dictator gets an expected PDV
of 119.93, voters receive only 59.93. The di®erence is the PDV of ego rents for being in
o±ce, Â. Note that, for the parameters of the model, these two values are the boundaries
of any solution of the democratic scenarios, for the incumbent and voters, respectively.
3.4 The Role of Elections as a Disciplining Device
Next I analyze a democratic environment under the polar cases of transparency, assuming
that the unique instrument voters have to punish the incumbent is their ability to vote
against him.
3.4.1 Full Transparency
Under full transparency, the observed signal is the true value of the shock. Both, the
incumbent and voters, observe the same variables, and this is common knowledge. Thus,
11there are no informational asymmetries. Voters can exactly predict the incumbent's be-
havior for each reelection rule, and so, optimally they will propose a ¹ U schedule that
maximizes their utilities by simultaneously providing enough incentives for the incumbent
to ensure he never chooses to expropriate. I formalize this idea in two propositions:
Proposition 1. Under full transparency the optimal rule is incentive compat-
ible with equality and p = 1.
To prove this, it is easy to see that among all ¹ U schedules associated with p = 1, the
one that is incentive compatible, ¹ Uic dominates the rest. Now, consider a new, higher
schedule ¹ Uh = ¹ Uic for all µ 6= ^ µ and ¹ Uh(^ µ) > ¹ Uic(^ µ), making it a potential candidate for
the optimal reelection rule. But p(^ µ) = 0 so ¹ Uh(^ µ) is never delivered by any incumbent
and thus ¹ Uh cannot dominate ¹ Uic.
Proposition 2. Rent extraction is positive even if there are no information
asymmetries.
See proof in the appendix. Intuitively, and even if e®ort were to be observable and
enforceable in the democratic setup, voters cannot extract all of the incumbent's ego rents
for being in o±ce since at this e®ort-level, the lifetime expected utility of voters and
incumbent is identical, but the period utility of expropriation versus observation of the
rule is higher. Therefore, the incumbent is always tempted to expropriate today and get
voters' utility in the future. Under full transparency, ego rents will reach the minimum
since voters can compute the incumbent's optimal policy for each contingent minimum
utility level that voters demand in order to keep reappointing him.5 The maximum per
period level of e®ort that voters can demand is e¤ = Á¡1(¯Â), which comes from the
no-expropriation-condition Â ¡ Á(e)=1 ¡ ¯ ¸ Â.
Figure 3 presents an extensive form of the game and helps to visualize the equilibrium
concept. Each ending node shows the payo®s for Incumbent 1 and Voters, respectively.
Voters move ¯rst by proposing the reelection rule ¹ U. I have claimed that there exists only
one reelection rule, ¹ U¤ that solves the Full Transparency problem, which is IC. Suppose
¹ U > ¹ U¤ and that the equilibrium strategy for any incumbent is to Ful¯ll ¹ U. Then, given
that Incumbent 2 should Ful¯ll, Incumbent 1 has incentives to deviate and choose to
Expropriate. Thus, Ful¯ll cannot be an equilibrium. If, on the other hand, voters demand
¹ U < ¹ U¤, the best response for any incumbent is to choose Ful¯ll, just as with ¹ U¤, which
is the only equilibrium.
To obtain the solution for any transparency level, I make a guess for ¹ U, calculate V I
and V v and check the IC constraint. A new ¹ U is proposed and the process repeated.
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Both rules are compared and kept the one that renders the higher V v. A new ¹ U is then
proposed and the iteration continues until no ¹ U is beaten.
Figure 4 shows the policy path of the full transparency equilibrium, for the same stream
of shocks as in Figure 2. In this case, the incumbent's e®ort is always positive and constant
at the level of e¤ = Á¡1(¯Â). For comparison purposes the ¯gure also shows the Social
Planner's levels of e®ort and debt. Under full transparency debt follows the exact same
path as the dictator or the social planner if ¹ U can be written as a full contingency plan that
states a di®erent minimum level for every µ and dt¡1. If ¹ Ucan be written only conditional
on µ, debt equals zero in equilibrium. I assume that it is too costly to write down a full
contingency schedule and so ¹ U only speci¯es a minimum level for each µ.
At equilibrium, voters obtain an expected discounted utility of 82.47, contrasted with
the 59.93 that they get in the dictatorship. In the Social Planner's benchmark case, where
debt follows the optimal path and e®ort can be set at a no-rent-extraction level, voters
and incumbent would have obtained 83.20. Fiscal outcomes are left for a subsection below
where I compare them across transparency levels. I now turn to analyze the other polar
case.
5In a similar setup, Persson, Roland and Tabellini call it \rents of being in power".
13Figure 4: Shock and Policy under Full Transparency and Social
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3.4.2 Full Opacity
Full opacity of the budgetary process is de¯ned as the situation in which ~ µ, voters' estimate
of the true ¯scal shock, is not informative, meaning that the observation of any ~ µ assigns
the same probability of occurrence to an speci¯c µ. In this case the type of solution of the
model is similar to that of Ferejohn (1986), in which voters will ask for a time invariant
minimum utility level and will keep reappointing the incumbent as long as he continues to
ful¯ll this requirement. There is an important di®erence with the Ferejohn model though,
which is that now the actual shock, µ, does not uniquely determine the policy outcome
since debt carried from the last period will play a role.
Table 2 describes the full opacity equilibrium. If voters were to demand 3.70 as the
cuto® rule for reelection, the incumbent will always choose to follow the rule, that is, the
probability of expropriation is zero. The PDV for incumbent and voter are 93.64 and 74.29
respectively.
Raising the bar to 3.80 per period makes no di®erence in the decision of the incumbent
with respect to expropriation; even when there are some possible states of the world in
which the incumbent should choose to expropriate, namely a combination of a bad shock
14(µ = :8) and a very high level of outstanding debt, these states have a zero probability of
occurrence.6 Accordingly, the PDV for incumbent and voter under a rule of 3.80 are 87.09
and 76.29, respectively.
Going beyond 3.80 progressively increases the probability of expropriation, but this
does not necessarily mean that V v will be lower since at ¯rst the marginal gains for
demanding a higher ¹ U will dominate the losses in case of expropriation, given that 1¡p is
very low. As ¹ U is increased, the second e®ect gains in importance over the ¯rst, reaching
equilibrium at the point where they equal each other. The maximum is attained at ¹ U¤ =
3:830 with a probability of expropriation of .018 and expected PDV for incumbent and
voter equal to 85.54 and 76.61, respectively.
Table 2: Full Opacity Equilibrium Rule.
¹ U 3.700 3.800 3.810 3.820 3.830 3.840 3.850
1-p 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.016 0.018 0.036 0.052
V v 74.29 76.29 76.37 76.39 76.61 76.42 76.35
V I 93.64 87.09 86.49 86.19 85.54 85.47 85.31
Figure 5 depicts policy paths under full opacity. Debt is more volatile and average
debt is higher than in the dictatorship. Moreover, the incumbent incurs in higher levels
of debt when µ is low and less productive, to help him ful¯ll the reelection rule. The
correlation between d and µ is ¡0:83. In contrast to the other two cases, e®ort shows
variability and can even be higher, in some periods, than in the full transparent case,
although average e®ort is, of course, lower. Similarly to debt, the incumbent chooses
higher levels of e®ort for lower levels of µ, being their correlations ¡0:87. In the ¯gure we
can see an expropriation period (and therefore a change of ruler) when e®ort reaches zero.
In this case, expropriation occurs after a second consecutive worst shock.
3.4.3 The Intermediate cases: High Transparency, Low Transparency, and
High Opacity
Consider the intermediate cases. Here, I am introducing a third de facto state variable: ~ µ.
Voters now condition the reelection rule on the observed signal. I explore three distinct
cases. High Transparency, a situation in which the signal is always informative; Low
Transparency, a case where sometimes the signal is informative and; High Opacity, a
circumstance in which the signal is almost never informative, and so it resembles Full
6Unless, of course, those are the initial conditions, but even in such case this can only happen for the
¯rst government since the outstanding debt for the next government following expropriation will never be
high enough.
15Figure 5: Shock and Policy under Full Opacity.





















Opacity. Figure 11 (see Appendix 2) shows how µ and ~ µ relate to each other depending
on ².
In the top panel of ¯gures 6 and 7 it can be seen how µ and ~ µ move together across
time. Although ~ µ is a good approximation of µ with ² = :1 and a bad one when ² = :3.
By moving towards more opaque scenarios, these ¯gures illustrate how debt and e®ort are
progressively employed only to salvage o±ce, rather than for e±ciency reasons, which are
measured by the contemporaneous correlations of e and d with µ (look at the bottom of
top panel in table 3).
Figure 7 shows two periods of expropriation. The ¯rst episode coincides with the one
obtained under full opacity. This episode would have being avoided if at least one of
the signals had coincided with the true shock. The second episode is the consequence of
two consecutive very uninformative signals, that make voters demand too much from the
incumbent.
16Figure 6: Shock and Policy under High Transparency.
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Transparency in the budgetary process is by no means the only force that conditions
the realization of ¯scal outcomes. In fact, the institutional arrangement that seems to
capture most of the attention in the literature is the set of numeric rules that the executive
has to face at the moment of elaboration, approval and execution of the budget. These
numeric constraints can take the form of speci¯c limits to expenditures, debt and de¯cit,
or restrictions to the °ow of resources between and within programs, agencies and levels
of government. The constraints could even be restrictions to the °ow of resources between
di®erent ¯scal periods. The most extended use of a numeric constraint is an explicit cap
on the budget de¯cit.
To incorporate this set of restrictions into the model, I condense them into a single de
jure budgetary rule. This allows me to evaluate, in the simplest manner, the e®ect these
rules can have when there are asymmetries in the information that players are receiving,
and thus address the possibility that the government can escape legal consequences by
exploiting ¯nancial loopholes. Speci¯cally, I introduce a no-additional-debt rule that has
to be observed by the incumbent with the same consequences as the minimum utility rule
already imposed. That is, if the incumbent fails to ful¯ll it, he will be voted out of o±ce in
17Figure 7: Shock and Policy under High Opacity.
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the following election. The problem with this rule, in contrast to the minimum utility rule,
is that voters cannot directly observe the actual level of debt, but rather, they can only
observe the reported level by the incumbent. Henceforth, I will call any deviation of the
reported level from the actual level creative accounting. The extent to which the incumbent
can use creative accounting as an instrument will be determined by the transparency level
of the economy.
Formally, the no-additional-debt rule means that the incumbent would be reelected if,
in addition to delivering ¹ U, he also ful¯ls:
dt · D(dt¡1) (14)
At this point it is necessary to introduce more structure about how creative accounting
can take place in the model. Following Milesi-Ferretti (2004) I assume that the extent of
creative accounting is inversely related to the degree of transparency, but I do not attempt
to derive it from within the model. This ad-hoc formulation is made for convenience.
Otherwise, one would have to introduce more structure about e®ort which would be as
arbitrary as directly modelling creative accounting. In particular, the game is modi¯ed by
assuming that after the delivery of the public good, the government reports the amount
18of debt that accrued during its production, ~ dt.
Figure 8: Timing of the Game.
t t+1





Any deviation from the true value of debt, that is if ~ dt 6= dt; will be considered creative
accounting. To simplify, I assume that the government's maximum amount of creative
accounting without being caught is: dt § ²dt, but that any attempt to engage in creative
accounting outside this interval will be detected by voters with probability one. For exam-
ple, ² = :1 means that the government can falsely report up to 10 per cent of the period's
debt without being caught.
In terms of the model I then introduce the enforceable no-additional-debt rule:
~ dt ¡ err = (1 ¡ ²)dt ¡ err · D(dt¡1) (15)
For all positive dt¡1 the maximum amount of possible diversion increases with ². The
term err, used for errors and omissions, is assumed to be constant across transparency
and is needed in order to avoid a zero-debt trap: without err, once dt¡1 reaches zero
the maximum amount of diversion is zero independently of the degree of transparency,
something that would trivialize the solution. In any case, err is set to the minimum.7
Figure 8 shows how the rule a®ects policy decision. After observing gt and ~ dt, voters
learn if ¹ U was satis¯ed and they have a rough idea of how much debt was utilized. After
the (audited) value of dt¡1 is released voters also learn if the enforceable rule was satis¯ed.
In this game, a government is voted out for three possible reasons: If ¹ U is not satis¯ed,
if creative accounting is detected (~ dt < (1 ¡ ²)dt), or if the enforceable no-additional-debt
rule is violated.
Even when the ad-hoc rule obviously makes it easier for opaque regimes to engage in
creative accounting, it does not trivialize the outcome since the rule will be binding for
some states in all regimes. That is to say, it imposes an e®ective cap on the per period
7The minimum err depends on how ¯ne the discrete state space is; the ¯ner the grid the smaller err
will be, de¯ned such that, if the d state space consists of n points and we index d by n where d(1) = 0,
d(n) = dmax, then err = d(2). In other words, if dt¡1 = 0, dt can take the ¯rst positive value.
19debt. This can be seen in ¯gures 9 and 10. The imposition of this numeric rule modi¯es
the government's choice of optimal debt: even when debt moves in the same direction as
in the unconstrained case|this is more pronounced as opacity increases|debt volatility
is signi¯cantly reduced. In the constrained case debt is almost never as high as in the
unconstrained case, but it is never as low either, reaching levels of zero debt only in the
expropriation periods. Therefore, even when one should never expect to see debt levels as
high as in the unconstrained case, this does not imply that average debt will be lower. The
government ¯nds it optimal to carry positive amounts of debt from period to period, since
this gives it bigger room for engaging in creative accounting in order to smooth e®ort. In
particular, in scenarios where there is no full transparency, the incumbent uses debt to
ful¯ll the requirements and be reappointed, precisely in bad states of the world, when he
is demanded relatively high levels of public good. But now the amount of debt that can be
issued will be constrained by the amount outstanding last period, giving him the incentive
to always carry over positive amounts of debt. This incentive will be enhanced as opacity
increases.
Figure 9: Policy Comparison under High Transparency.
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Effort: U(bar) (solid), U(bar) + Legal Constraint (dashed)
20Figure 10: Policy Comparison under High Opacity.
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3.6 The E®ects of Transparency and Numeric Rules: Welfare,
Public Good, and Debt
The top panel of table 3 compares welfare, the average level of debt, and the average levels
of public good, for the di®erent degrees of transparency when no numeric rule is imposed.
The bottom panel 3 does the same but including the no-additional-debt rule.
This exercises show, as in Ferejohn (1986), that more transparency is associated with
an increase in welfare, driven by the average level of public good. The value added of
the present setup is that is has been linked to public debt. Whereas in the long-run
more transparency is always associated with lower levels of debt, in the short-run this is
not always the case. For instance, by comparing Figures 6 and 7, it can be seen that
between periods 10 and 20 the high transparency regime shows many periods with higher
equilibrium debt than in the high opacity regime, for the same stream of shocks.
Contrasting the top and bottom panels of table 3, it can be seen that the the addition
of the no-additional-debt rule does not necessarily imply a lower average debt across all
regimes. In particular, whereas the highly transparent regime does reduce its average debt,
the more opaque regimes increase average debt by non-insigni¯cant magnitudes. Moreover,
aside from the social planner case where it is obvious that debt and welfare has to decline,
21the introduction of the numerical rule improves voter's welfare in the highly transparent
scenario and worsens it in the more opaque ones.
Table 3: Welfare, Public Goods, and Debt.
Descriptive Statistics: Only Transparency
Regime Dictator Social Full High Low High Full
Planner Transparency Transparency Transparency Opacity Opacity
V v 59.93 83.20 82.47 80.71 78.11 77.01 76.61
gmean 2.92 4.18 4.12 4.05 3.97 3.89 3.89
dmean 0.047 0.047 0.00 0.050 0.065 0.072 0.087
emean 0.00 1.155 1.125 1.058 0.973 0.925 0.906
corr(e,µ) | | | -0.39 -0.63 -0.75 -0.87
corr(d,µ) 0.96 0.96 | -0.48 -0.64 -0.74 -0.83
Descriptive Statistics: Transparency and No-Additional-Debt Rule
Regime Dictator Social Full High Low High Full
Planner Transparency Transparency Transparency Opacity Opacity
V v | 83.11 82.47 80.82 77.39 76.08 75.54
gmean | 4.17 4.12 4.06 4.00 3.91 3.91
dmean | 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.072 0.083 0.102
emean | 1.155 1.125 1.061 0.956 0.921 0.931
corr(e,µ) | | | -0.43 -0.71 -0.80 -0.93
corr(d,µ) | | | 0.07 -0.44 -0.54 -0.66
4 Empirical Evidence
The model presented in the ¯rst part of the paper has clear predictions about the amount
of public goods produced and the level of debt incurred, for di®erent degrees of budgetary
transparency and the inclusion of numeric rules. While it would be very di±cult to measure
the delivery of public goods across countries, the data on public debt is readily available.
For this simple reason, in this section I test the predictions of the model only on measures
of debt. Additionally, measures of ¯scal balance are also employed as dependent variable,
since the level of public debt is re°ecting the accumulation of de¯cits across time.
In concrete, the models' predictions I want to test are:
² Countries with higher degree of budgetary transparency should exhibit lower levels
of public debt and ¯scal de¯cits.
² Numeric rules should induce lower levels of public debt and ¯scal de¯cits only if
budgetary transparency is su±ciently high.
22To assess the e®ect of numerical rules and budgetary transparency on ¯scal outcomes,
I construct several indices of these budgetary institutions and then regress a series of ¯scal
outcome variables on these indices and other controls.
4.1 Measuring Transparency and Numerical Rules
The data for the construction of the indices was obtained from the OECD/World Bank
Survey of Budget Practices and Procedures (2003). The database contains more that 350
questions covering all sorts of issues about the budgeting process for 38 countries.8 I started
by selecting those questions that were directly related to transparency and numerical
rules. From that set, I eliminated questions that were too similar|after corroborating
that answers were the same|and I eliminated questions with ambiguous interpretations.
At the end I ended up with 11 questions that were relevant to numerical rules and 14
questions for transparency.
To construct each index, every answer was given a value that ranged between zero and
one, where higher values re°ected institutions that should enhance ¯scal discipline. Since,
in general, questions had more than two answers, partial weights were proportionately
distributed, following the method of Alesina et. al. (1999). Finally, the two indices were
standardized so that each ranges from zero to one, which eased comparisons between them.
4.1.1 Transparency
How can one budgetary process be de¯ned to be more transparent than other? Trans-
parency is not a unidimensional concept; the literature contains many de¯nitions that
agree on the central issues of transparency, but authors assign di®erent weights to its
components, and omit others.
Based on the many de¯nitions of transparency in the literature, Alt and Lassen (2003)
try to rationalize and provide guidance of what a good measure of budgetary transparency
would be. For this purpose they identify four main characteristics of transparency. First,
more transparent procedures should process more information, and other things being
equal, use fewer documents. This speaks to openness and ease of access and monitoring.
Second, transparency is increased by the possibility of independent veri¯cation, which
has been experimentally shown to be a key feature in making communication persuasive
and credible. Third, there should be a commitment to non-arbitrary language: words
and classi¯cations should have clear, shared, unequivocal meanings. Finally, the presence
of ex-ante more justi¯cation increases transparency, reducing the possibility of ex-post
strategic justi¯cation.
8For the list of countries, see Table 9 in Appendix 2
23To construct the transparency index, the following questions were employed, shown
under the Alt and Lassen (2003) classi¯cation:
² More information, other things equal, in fewer documents
{ Does the annual central government budget documentation submitted to the
legislature/parliament contain multi-year expenditure estimates?
{ At what interval is information on the in-year budget implementation released?
{ Are the following accounts (assets, liabilities, government equity, revenues, ex-
penses) integrated into the accounting system to facilitate the preparation of
¯nancial statements?
² Independent veri¯cation
{ Does the government announce the release dates for information on the in-year
budget implementation in advance?
{ Are economic assumptions available for scrutiny?
{ Is this information audited?
{ Are audited ¯nal accounts published and available publicly?
{ Are internal audit procedures clear and subject to e®ective process review by
external auditors?
{ Are the ¯ndings of the National Audit Body available to the public?
{ Are government entities subject to ¯nancial audits by an external auditor?
² Non-arbitrary language
{ Does the government uses accrual accounting in its ¯nancial statements?
{ Is there a uni¯ed accounting and budgeting classi¯cation system?
² More justi¯cation
{ Does the budget documentation contain a discussion of what impact variations
in the key economic assumptions (sensitivity analysis) would have on the budget
outturn?
{ Does the published information have a comparison between actual and planned
spending for the period covered?
The main transparency index has more weight on the veri¯cation side and in the type
of information presented, and less on the amount of information per se. It seems more
important to have fewer pieces of transcendental, bottom-lined and audited information
at the relevant time than large amounts of data that might confuse rather than clarify the
government objectives.
244.1.2 Numerical Rules
The possibility of running larger de¯cits or increasing the level of expenditures is, in
principle, established in the legislation. Other things being equal, one should observe
higher ¯scal de¯cits or debt levels the less constrained is the budgetary process. Note,
however, that the model presented in the ¯rst part of the paper establishes that the e®ects
of numerical rules on ¯scal outcomes depend on the level of transparency.
Ideally it would be possible to distinguish between restrictions to the overall budget
and to the composition of it and, presumably, only the ¯rst type should a®ect aggregate
¯scal outcomes. In practice, such separation might not exist; budgetary processes that
allow inter program transfers, for instance, can create a bigger budget by ex-ante in°ating
accounts or programs that are not so carefully watched in comparison to others and then
making ex-post transfers. If this type of connection is of true importance or just a second
order e®ect is a question that I try to answer here. For this reason, the questions used
to construct the numerical constraint index were separated in three categories: those that
refer to direct restrictions to the overall budget, those that refer to transfers within the
¯scal budget, and those that refer to transfers between di®erent budgetary years.
² Direct Restrictions
{ In developing the budget, are there ¯scal rules placing limits on Executive ¯scal
policy discretion?
{ Can you change expenditures outside the budget process?
² Between Restrictions
{ Is it possible to carry-over unused appropriations for operating costs (salaries,
etc.) from one year to another?
{ Is it possible to carry-over unused appropriations for investments (building con-
struction, etc.) from one year to another?
{ Is it possible to carry-over unused appropriations for transfer programs from
one year to another?
{ Is it possible for managers of ministries/government organizations to borrow
against future appropriations for operating costs (salaries, etc.)?
{ Is it possible to borrow against future appropriations for investments (building
construction, etc.)?
² Within Restrictions
{ Are there laws, regulations or policies that de¯ne the permitted uses of the
budget reserves and the decision-making authorities for approving allocations
from the reserves?
25{ Are government organizations allowed to transfer funds between operating ex-
penditures, investments and program funds?
{ Can appropriations be reallocated from one program to another?
{ More generally, are transfers permitted between capital investments or transfer
programs (social security pensions, etc.) and operating expenditures?
I compute three main numerical constraints indices. The ¯rst one assigns equal weight
to each question which implicitly gives more importance to within and between constraints
since both represent nine out of eleven questions. Two additional measures are then com-
puted to tackle this problem. The second index gives half the weight to direct restrictions
and the other half to the within and between constraints. The third index disregards the
within and between e®ects concentrating only on direct constraints.
4.2 The E®ects of Budgetary Institutions on Fiscal Outcomes.
This section presents a series of econometric models that try to answer the question of
how di®erent budgetary institutions, in the form of the constructed indices, a®ect ¯scal
outcomes across countries. First, I introduce the benchmark model, which controls for
economic and demographic variables that has been shown to a®ect ¯scal outcomes. Sec-
ond, I study possible di®erences in the estimated parameters, depending on the degree of
development of the countries in the sample. Finally, I add to the model a series of political
variables that can also a®ect ¯scal outcomes.
4.2.1 Data and the Benchmark Model
Fiscal outcomes variables come from the World Economic Outlook (WEO), produced by
the International Monetary Fund, and were constructed as averages of the period 1999-
2003. All the remaining economic and population variables are directly extracted, or
constructed from, the World Development Indicators (WDI). The political variables are
from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI2004) by Philip Keefer (District Magnitude
and Number of E®ective Parliamentary Parties), and from The Economist (Cabinet Size).
The empirical strategy is to ¯t the following benchmark model:
FO = ¯0 + ¯1Transparency + ¯2NumericalRules + ¯3Hierarchical + ~ ¯0X + ²; (16)
where FO, that stands for Fiscal Outcomes, can alternatively take the form of General Bal-
ance, Central Balance, General Net Debt, and General Gross Debt, all expressed as ratios
26to GDP and, as was mentioned earlier, averaged over the 1999-2003 period. Transparency
and NumericalRules are the computed institutional indexes that were described in the
previous subsection. Hierarchical is an index trying to measure the third budgetary insti-
tution recognized in the literature, procedural rules, and was constructed in a similar way
as the other two indexes.9 X is a vector of economic and demographic control variables
that can potentially in°uence ¯scal outcomes. The controls are, ¯rst, the average growth
of GDP for the 1990-2003 period (Avg. Growth) which is believed to be directly related
to revenues due to the progressivity of the tax structure and higher tax revenues from job
creation, and inversely (or neutrally) related to expenditures, due to lower unemployment
bene¯ts paid by the state. Added together, these should have a positive e®ect on ¯scal
balances and a negative e®ect on public debt. Second, the Dependency Ratio, de¯ned as
the sum of population under 12 and over 65, divided by total population and averaged
over the 1999-2003 period, is expected to have the opposite e®ects to Avg. Growth on
¯scal outcomes since a higher dependency ratio represents a lower taxable base on one
hand, and higher expenditure on education and in the pension system, other things being
equal. The third variable (Wagner) is the average GDP per capita over the 1999-2003
period, measured in dollars and adjusted by PPP, that is used as a proxy for the country's
development level. This variable controls for Wagner's law, the prediction of a positive
correlation between the development level of an economy and it's share of public expendi-
ture to GDP. It is important to note that this variable may be correlated with budgetary
institutions. However, all the results that are reported below are robust to the exclusion of
the Wagner variable from the benchmark model. Additionally, I have conducted another
exercise splitting the sample according to the development level of countries, in order to
account for this potential source of bias. The last control is the degree of openness of
an economy, de¯ned as the ratio of the sum of total exports and total imports to GDP
(Openness). This variable is included to account for the empirical ¯nding (Rodrik (1996))
that more open economies tend to have larger levels of government. I have also included
the value of the dependent variable in 1990 as a control for the evolution of the analyzed
¯scal outcome during the last decade.
There are two potential problems with the econometric speci¯cation. The ¯rst one is
endogeneity: In the literature, and this work is no exception, budgetary institutions are
9Procedural rules dictate the timing and mechanisms by which the executive drafts the budget, it's
discussion and approval in the legislature, and its posterior implementation. These procedural rules
determine the relative strength of the players involved in the budgeting process within the executive
and between the executive and the legislature. In this literature, procedural rules are classi¯ed on a
hierarchical-collegial spectrum. At the stage of budgeting drafting, hierarchical rules are those that tilt
the balance of power in favor of the ¯nance minister, who faces the whole government budget constraint,
and in detriment of spending ministers, who care almost exclusively about their own portfolio. On the
contrary, collegial rules are those in which the role of the ¯nance minister is more passive and limited. At
the approval stage, hierarchical rules are those that impose more constraints on the legislature's ability to
modify the budget proposed by the executive, and in particular, on its ability to increase the size of the
budget or the de¯cit. At the execution stage, hierarchical rules are those that limit the possibility of the
legislature to increase the budget once it has been approved.
27treated as being exogenous, while it is also recognized that they are indeed endogenous,
particularly to past ¯scal outcomes. The justi¯cation to this treatment is that, at least
in the short run, institutions are reasonably di±cult to change, and therefore are changed
relatively infrequently. Since it is costly and complex to change institutions, the existing
ones have to be very unsatisfactory before it is worth changing them; as a result, there is
a strong \status quo" bias in institutional reform. Therefore, at least up to a point, one
can use institutional features as explanatory variables (Alesina and Perotti (1999)). The
second problem is the potential correlation between the budgetary institutional variables.
Indeed, while the simple correlation between transparency and the other two measures of
budgetary institutions is not di®erent from zero, the Hierarchical and Numerical Rules
variables are positively correlated. I used di®erent de¯nitions for Numerical Rules and
also drop the Hierarchical variable to account for this problem, and the results remain
qualitatively the same.
The benchmark results for Central Balance, General Balance, General Net Debt, and
General Gross Debt are presented in table 4. For each ¯scal outcome, the model with
only the economic controls, is reported on the left columns, and the economic controls and
budgetary institutions on the columns of the right.
Looking at the models with the economic controls alone, there are two aspects that
are worth mentioning. First, in none of the four ¯scal outcomes analyzed are all of the
economic controls signi¯cant at the same time but, nevertheless, we can con¯dently reject
the null of all coe±cients being jointly equal to zero. Moreover, every economic control
enters signi¯cantly in at least half of the ¯scal outcomes analyzed. Second, all the economic
controls that enter signi¯cantly in each equation, does it with the expected sign, although
some of them lose signi¯cance once the budgetary variables are included in.10
Looking at the columns on the right in table 4 for each ¯scal outcome, it can be seen
that budgetary transparency helps to explain the cross-country di®erences of all ¯scal
outcomes, although the e®ect seems to be stronger for the debt variables than for the
¯scal balance variables. At the same time, it can also be seen that numerical rules do not
enter signi¯cantly in any of the regressions. These results are congruent with the model
presented in the previous section.
The interpretation of the point estimates of Transparency is that an increase in this
variable of one standard deviation (0.12) from its midpoint (0.69) is associated with, rel-
ative to GDP, a ¯scal stance improvement of 1.2 and 1.6 percent on Central and General
Balance, and with a 10.4 and 12.4 percent reductions in General Net Debt and General
Gross Debt, respectively. In terms of the explained cross country variation, the inclu-
sion Transparency in the benchmark model improves considerably the R-squared of the
10Dropping one control at a time did not change the signi¯cance level of any of the other variables.
Their coe±cient values never changed more than 5%. Since there are good theoretical motives to suspect
that the non-signi¯cant controls truly a®ect ¯scal outcomes they are left as part of the regression.
28regressions.
Table 4: Benchmark Model.
Central Balance General Balance General Net Debt General Gross Debt
Dep. Var. 1990 0.084 0.077 0.204¤¤ 0.242¤ 0.862¤¤¤ 0.912¤¤¤ 0.779¤¤¤ 0.753¤¤¤
(0.056) (0.082) (0.099) (0.126) (0.083) (0.097) (0.109) (0.074)
Avg. Growth 0.007 0.006 0.005 -0.002 -0.123¤¤¤ -0.093¤¤¤ -0.122¤¤¤ -0.098¤¤¤
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.022) (0.031) (0.027) (0.022)
Dependency Rat. 0.094 0.042 0.102 ¤ 0.016 -2.364¤¤¤ -1.472¤ -1.718¤¤¤ -1.150¤¤¤
(0.060) (0.061) (0.058) (0.057) (0.629) (0.731) (0.554) (0.396)
Wagner 0.002¤¤¤ 0.002¤¤¤ 0.002 ¤¤¤ 0.002 ¤¤¤ -0.002 -0.003 0.000 0.001
(0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0036) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0027)
Openness 0.023¤ 0.019 0.035¤¤ 0.041¤¤ -0.194¤ -0.188 -0.266¤ -0.204¤
(0.013) (0.014) (0.016) (0.018) (0.106) (0.110) (0.130) (0.100)
Transparency 0.106¤¤ 0.136¤ -0.891¤¤¤ -1.063¤¤¤
(0.050) (0.068) (0.272) (0.315)
NumericalRules 0.025 0.056 -0.142 0.057
(0.028) (0.042) (0.153) (0.178)
Hierarchical 0.000 0.008 -0.083 -0.085
(.029) (0.037) (0.161) (0.156)
Constant -0.123¤¤ -0.173¤¤ -0.140¤¤ -0.216¤¤ 1.672¤¤¤ 1.896¤¤¤ 1.439¤¤¤ 1.826¤¤¤
(0.050) (0.069) (0.053) (0.082) (0.389) (0.361) (0.348) (0.369)
R2 0.46 0.57 0.50 0.63 0.88 0.93 0.74 0.86
No. of Observations 36 36 37 37 25 25 30 30
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.¤¤¤ signi¯cant at 1%, ¤¤ signi¯cant at 5% and, ¤ signi¯cant at 10%.
4.2.2 Di®erent Speci¯cations for Numerical Rules
As was already mentioned, one can immediately suspect a wrong speci¯cation of the
numerical rules index employed above, since it gives the same weight to factors that directly
constrain the size of government and de¯cits, and to those that can a®ect them indirectly.
The other two proposed speci¯cations for Numerical Rules are presented in table 5, where
I have omitted to report the control variables. NumericalRules 2 gives half of the weight
to direct restrictions on the budget and the other half to between and within restrictions.
NumericalRules 3 takes into account only direct restrictions. As can be seen, the lack
of signi¯cance of the numerical rules index is not due to its speci¯cation. In turn, the
Transparency measure is not a®ected by these changes in the NumericalRules speci¯cation.
29Table 5: Benchmark Model: Di®erent Numerical Rules.
Central General General General
Balance Balance Net Debt Gross Debt
Transparency 0.106¤¤ 0.132¤ -0.833¤¤¤ -1.078¤¤¤
(0.051) (0.072) (0.260) (0.319)
NumericalRules 2 0.006 0.028 -0.027 0.016
(0.024) (0.036) (0.129) (0.127)
Hierarchical 0.010 0.018 -0.101 -0.073
(0.028) (0.037) (0.171) (0.145)
R2 0.56 0.61 0.93 0.86
Central General General General
Balance Balance Net Debt Gross Debt
Transparency 0.105¤¤ 0.127¤ -0.818¤¤¤ -1.085¤¤¤
(0.050) (0.072) (0.252) (0.317)
NumericalRules 3 -0.011 -0.005 0.029 -0.005
(0.017) (0.022) (0.088) (0.089)
Hierarchical 0.022 0.037 -0.139 -0.065
(0.030) (0.040) (0.179) (0.136)
R2 0.57 0.60 0.93 0.86
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.¤¤¤ signi¯cant at 1%, ¤¤ signi¯cant at 5% and,
¤ signi¯cant at 10%.
4.2.3 Budgetary Institutions and Development
In the benchmark model I have tried to account for all sources of heterogeneity, even the
development level of a country. However if the degree of development is correlated with
budgetary institutions but it is not|or in a di®erent way|with the measures of budgetary
institutions, the results obtained above will be inexorably biased. Suppose, for example,
that the punishment for a policymaker that is caught cheating is more severe in a rich than
in a poor country. Then, it will be expected that the same degree of transparency will
exert a higher in°uence on ¯scal outcomes in rich than in poor countries, something that
the transparency index will not capture. In trying to account for this possibility I divided
the data set into rich and poor countries, using the original OECD as rich countries, and
ran the same set of regressions to see if the estimated parameters are stable to sample
speci¯cation. The results, that are reported in table 6, should be taken with caution, since
now each sub-sample is very small. Indeed, it is not even possible to run the General Net
Debt regression for the poor countries sample.
In this exercise, the results that were obtained for the whole sample, are preserved in
the sub-sample of rich countries, and all but disappear in the sub-sample of poor countries.
This suggests that the result of Transparency being the only budgetary institution that
matters in the whole sample, is basically driven by rich countries.
30Table 6: Rich vs. Poor Countries.
Rich Countries Central General General General
Balance Balance Net Debt Gross Debt
Transparency 0.184¤ 0.181¤ -1.356¤¤¤ -1.313¤¤
(0.087) (0.095) (0.301) (0.518)
NumericalRules -0.004 0.014 0.0419 0.096
(0.053) (0.054) (0.220) (0.369)
Hierarchical 0.068 0.070 -0.211 0.114
(0.088) (0.095) (0.401) (0.397)
R2 0.64 0.57 0.95 0.86
No. of Observations 17 18 17 18
Poor Countries Central General General General
Balance Balance Net Debt Gross Debt
Transparency 0.102 0.124 { -0.581
(0.084) (0.114) (0.377)
NumericalRules 0.051 0.117 { 0.930¤
(0.070) (0.097) (0.360)
Hierarchical -0.016 -0.023 { -0.526
(0.046) (0.052) (0.333)
R2 0.49 0.50 { 0.96
No. of Observations 19 19 9 12
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.¤¤¤ signi¯cant at 1%, ¤¤ signi¯cant at 5% and,
¤ signi¯cant at 10%.
An interesting result from this exercise is that in the Gross Debt speci¯cation for less
developed countries, NumericalRules enters signi¯cantly but with the opposite sign of what
is expected. Dropping one economic control at a time does not destroy this result except
when growth is left out. A possible interpretation of this result is that less developed
countries typically face credit constraints from the private sector which can be softened if
balanced budget rules are in place. Of course, this or any other interpretation should be
taken with caution given the small sample size, as was already mentioned.11
Given that I have controlled for economic di®erences across countries, that splitting an
already small sample is very costly in terms of degrees of freedom, and that the inclusion
of less developed countries in the analysis does not signi¯cantly a®ect the results when
compared to the sub-sample of rich countries, I have chosen to continue with the whole
sample. Nevertheless, the results presented so far in this section help to understand dis-
crepancies in the literature of budgetary institutions and ¯scal outcomes. For example, the
Latin American experience, composed of all under-developed countries, was documented
11I also employed the other two de¯nitions of NumericalRules and while the results are preserved for
the intermediate speci¯cation(NumericalRules 2), the coe±cient losses all signi¯cance for the more strict
one (NumericalRules 3).
31by Alesina et. al. (1999), and Filc and Scartascini (2004) who found that only numer-
ical constraints and hierarchical procedures motives are important in determining ¯scal
outcomes.
4.2.4 Political Controls
So far, I have analyzed the e®ects of budgetary institutions on ¯scal outcomes taking into
account economic variables that have been shown to in°uence ¯scal policy. Here, I add to
the model a variety of political variables that have also been shown to be correlated with
¯scal outcomes. All of these political variables capture the idea of fragmented government.
Government fragmentation arises when several agents or groups participate in the ¯scal
decision-making process, each with its own interest and constituencies to satisfy, and each
with some weight in the ¯nal decision. To participate in the majority, each group demands
a share in the budget; as all groups do this, the end result is a high level of expenditure
or a large de¯cit (Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999)). In other words, fragmentation is an
expression of a common pool problem.
First, I add to the model a measure of district magnitude, de¯ned as the average num-
ber of representatives elected per district to the Lower House. Several theoretical and
empirical studies show that, other things being equal, the degree of government fragmen-
tation increases with the number of political parties. In turn, the number of political
parties increases with district magnitude. Consequently, one should expect the common
pool problem to be enhanced as average district magnitude augment.
The second variable of consideration is the e®ective number of parliamentary or legisla-




si is the percentage of seats won by the ith party. While district magnitude is a direct
characteristic of the electoral system, its e®ect on ¯scal policy is expected to go through
outcomes of the electoral system as, in this case, the ENPP. A larger ENPP represents
a more fragmented government and thus, countries with a higher ENPP are expected to
have larger governments, to be more indebted, and to run larger de¯cits.
Following Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999), the third variable under consideration is
cabinet size, de¯ned as the sum of all spending ministers. While this variable does not
re°ect government fragmentation per se, it is related to the idea of more decision-makers
wanting to maximize their share of the budget; in this case, from the executive side of the
budgeting process. In other words, it is expected that more numerous cabinets will tend
to be associated with bigger governments and larger de¯cits.
Finally, I control for the degree of income inequality using the Gini coe±cient.12 The
idea for including this variable is that, if agents are altruistic, they will care for their
12Although inequality is not a political variable, it is not commonly used in the budgetary institutions
literature so I decided to use it as an additional control rather than in the benchmark model.
32descendants and thus the current generation of taxpayers will refrain from redistributing
wealth from future generations of taxpayers by contracting public debt. Cuckierman and
Meltzer (1989) as well as Tabellini (1991) have pointed out that this altruistic e®ect be-
comes weaker the higher the income inequality, and consequently higher levels of public
debt should be expected.13
In table 7 I present the regression results of including these political controls. I ¯rst
proceed to estimate each equation including all three budgetary institutions, but in no case
were NumericalRules or Hierarchical signi¯cant. I re-estimated all regressions dropping
these variables in order to gain degrees of freedom and to avoid a problem of possible multi-
collinearity since the Hierarchical index and the political variables are possibly capturing
the same e®ect. Since none of the estimated coe±cients changed qualitatively from one
speci¯cation to the other, I report the latter, omitting once again the results of the other
controls.
District Magnitude does not seem to a®ect ¯scal outcomes. The lack of District Magni-
tude's explanatory power is consistent with the results of Stein, Talvi and Grisanti (1999)
on a sample of Latin American countries. The reason for this outcome, as mentioned
above, could be due to District Magnitude a®ecting ¯scal outcomes only indirectly, and
that this e®ect is either too low or that it fails to show up in this short data set. However,
the E®ective Number of Parliamentary Parties, that is a direct measure of the common
pool e®ect, only shows a signi¯cant e®ect for General Gross Debt. None of these two
political variables alters in a signi¯cant way the e®ect of Transparency on ¯scal outcomes.
Again, the Cabinet Size variable enters signi¯cantly only in the General Gross Debt
regression. However, in this case the e®ect of Transparency on the Central and General
Balance is not robust to the inclusion of Cabinet Size. This result is not driven by the
countries included in the regression since re estimating the benchmark model using only the
data points for which Cabinet Size is available, still yielded levels of signi¯cance equivalent
to those when the full sample was employed. What drives this result is the fact that Cabinet
Size and Transparency are highly and positively correlated (0.43) at a .02 signi¯cance level.
This collinearity problem has the e®ect of dampening their signi¯cance levels when both
variables are included. Why Transparency and Cabinet Size are correlated is a question
that is not treated here but that surely needs further exploration; there is no a priori reason
to think the former causes the ¯rst which would have resulted in Cabinet Size being the
true underling force. For clari¯cation purposes, it's worth mentioning that Transparency
is not correlated with any of the other control variables.
The Gini coe±cient enters signi¯cantly in the General Net Debt regressions. As men-
tioned above, the only implied relationship from theory was that more inequality should
be paired with more indebtedness due to a decrease in the bequest motive of an altruistic
agent. Transparency remains robust to the inclusion of this variable.
13See Feld and Kirchgassner (1999) for a complete elaboration of this idea.
33Table 7: Political Controls.
Central General General General
Balance Balance Net Debt Gross Debt
Transparency 0.106¤¤ 0.124¤ -0.807¤¤¤ -1.071¤¤¤
(0.049) (0.069) (0.240) (0.337)
District Magnitude -0.000 -0.000 -0.006 -0.001
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0007)
R2 0.56 0.59 0.93 0.87
No. of Observations 36 37 25 29
Transparency 0.118¤¤ 0.146¤ -0.960¤¤¤ -1.194¤¤¤
(0.055) (0.079) (0.192) (0.338)
ENPP -0.000 -0.000 0.020 0.034¤
(0.003) (0.003) (0.016) (0.017)
R2 0.57 0.60 0.94 0.87
No. of Observations 33 34 24 28
Transparency 0.098 0.129 -0.942¤¤¤ -1.437¤¤¤
(0.086) (0.111) (0.245) (0.299)
Cabinet Size 0.002 0.002 -0.007 0.020¤¤
(0.002) (0.002) (0.010) (0.007)
R2 0.57 0.60 0.94 0.88
No. of Observations 30 30 23 25
Transparency 0.126¤¤ 0.152¤ -0.960¤¤ -1.221¤¤¤
(0.054) (0.079) (0.177) (0.305)
Gini Coe±cient -0.001 -0.000 0.008¤¤ 0.006
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.005)
R2 0.58 0.61 0.95 0.87
No. of Observations 32 33 24 28
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.¤¤¤ signi¯cant at 1%, ¤¤ signi¯cant at 5% and,
¤ signi¯cant at 10%.
4.3 Testing for an Interaction E®ect between Transparency and
Numerical Rules
Lastly, I analyze the possibility of conditional numerical constraints. The consistent fail-
ure of ¯nding any signi¯cant relationship between the di®erent measures of numerical
constraints and ¯scal outcomes may be due to the impossibility of enforcing those con-
straints. Speci¯cally, if the budgetary process is su±ciently opaque, it would be hard
for the constituents to detect any deviation from the rule, and therefore the constraints
might not bind. There are, at least, two empirical strategies to test for conditional nu-
merical constraints. The ¯rst consists of dividing the data set between transparent and
non transparent countries and running the same set of regressions in both sub-samples.
One should expect to obtain a signi¯cant coe±cient for NumericalRules in the transparent
34sub sample and still a non-signi¯cant one for the opaque set of countries. The advantage
of dividing the sample is a straightforward interpretation of the test since, provided that
Transparency is exogenous and independent, one is comparing two sets of countries that
will only di®er in their transparency level. Of course this comes at the high cost of drop-
ping many observations which in a small cross-section like this one might turn out to be
prohibitive. I tried this strategy, separating the data set in two halves, but I did not ¯nd
any signi¯cant coe±cient for NumericalRules in any of its speci¯cations, either in the high
or low Transparency group.
The second strategy is to take advantage of the whole data set and test for an inter-
action e®ect between Transparency and NumericalRules directly. However, it is not clear
that an interacted variable, such as the one constructed by multiplying Transparency and
NumericalRules, will capture the true relationship between these variables. The interac-
tion assumes a continuous relationship between the two constituent variables, though it
is plausible that a minimum level of transparency is required for numerical constraints
to become binding. This e®ect might not be captured by a standard interaction model.
To investigate this possibility I followed two approaches: First, I evaluated a standard
interaction model and, second, I multiplied the NumericalRules measures with a dummy
variable that separates countries by their Transparency level (I used the top half and top
third most transparent countries) with the aim of capturing any discontinuity in this in-
teraction. Again, I did not ¯nd robust evidence of any sort of interaction e®ect within this
sample of countries.
It is possible that the failure of numeric constraints of showing any type of e®ect over
¯scal outcomes may be due to the short sample of countries surveyed. More data would
be needed to answer this question in a de¯nite manner.
5 Concluding Remarks
In a simple model in which voters can coordinate perfectly to demand results from the pol-
icymaker in charge of the government (who typically will enjoy an informational advantage
about the true actions taken in the production of public goods), the model shows that the
best way to curtail the government's unproductive activities and curb a tendency to incur
greater debt is by reducing the informational advantage directly. That is, by increasing
the level of transparency of the whole budgetary process. On the contrary, according to
the model presented in this paper, if voters' strategy is to impose numeric constraints over
imperfectly observed ¯scal outcomes, these will have the desired e®ect only if the level
of transparency is su±ciently high. When transparency is very low, the imposition of a
numeric constraint could even carry the contrary e®ect, that is, higher average debt and
lower expected welfare.
35I use a new survey on budgetary practices, with the broadest country coverage so
far, to construct several measures of numerical constraints and transparency and test
the predictions of the model. The results for the whole sample of countries indicate
that only the level of transparency shows a signi¯cant and economically important e®ect
on Central and General De¯cits, as well as on General Net and Gross Debts. On the
contrary, numerical rules failed to show any signi¯cant e®ect on ¯scal outcomes. These
results conform with the predictions of the theoretical model. On the other hand, however,
contrary to what was obtained in the model, for this sample of countries there does not
seem to exist an interaction e®ect between transparency and numerical constraints.
36Appendix 1
Proof of Proposition 2: To prove it, consider a regime which di®ers considerably
from a democracy, in which a contract to run the government forever in a fully transparent
world is auctioned among the population. The contract is enforced by killing the incumbent
in case he does not respect it. A ¯rst citizen will place a bid that consists of a constant
per period e®ort level, and debt satisfying (2.14). If no other citizen places a higher bid
the game ends and payo®s to the ruler and citizen are distributed according to V I and V v,
respectively. The unique equilibrium of this game is e¤ = Á¡1(Â) or zero-rent-extraction:
no citizen will o®er a higher bid since his payo® as a ruler will be lower than as a citizen; on
the other side, any outstanding bid ^ e 2 [0;Á¡1(Â)) will not survive in the game since it is
a dominant strategy for the bidding citizen to play e¤ and get V I(e¤) = V v(e¤) > V v(^ e). I
call the solution to this game the social planner solution and denote its expected discounted
utility as V sp.
The social planner problem is solved following the same method outlined in the dicta-
torship. The idea is to choose only d conditional on µ since e = e¤. The two ¯rst order
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t for all µ by the amount Â¡µe¤. Finally, note that proposition
2 is equivalent to stating that no social planner solution can be achieved. To see this, let
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t , which is a contradiction.
37Appendix 2
Figure 11: Co-movement of µ and ~ µ conditional on ².
38Table 8: Data Availability.
Country Central General General General
Balance Balance Net Debt Gross Debt
Argentina Y Y No No
Australia Y Y Y Y
Austria Y Y Y Y
Belgium Y Y Y Y
Bolivia No Y No No
Canada Y Y Y Y
Chile Y Y Y Y
Colombia Y Y No No
Czech Republic Y Y No No
Denmark Y Y Y Y
Finland Y Y Y Y
France Y Y Y Y
Germany Y Y Y Y
Greece Y Y Y Y
Hungary Y Y Y No
Iceland Y Y Y Y
Ireland Y Y Y Y
Israel Y Y Y Y
Italy Y Y Y Y
Japan Y Y Y Y
Jordan Y Y No No
Kenya Y Y No No
Korea, Republic Y No No No
Mexico Y Y Y Y
Morocco Y Y Y Y
Netherlands Y Y Y Y
New Zealand Y Y Y Y
Norway Y Y Y Y
Portugal Y Y No Y
Slovak Republic Y Y No Y
Slovenia Y Y No Y
South Africa Y Y Y Y
Spain Y Y Y Y
Sweden No Y No Y
Turkey Y Y No No
United Kingdom Y Y Y Y
United States Y Y Y Y
Uruguay Y Y No Y
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